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INTRODUCTION
Evidence derived from classified national-security information
has long been a part of court proceedings in the United States.1 Despite
the longstanding nature of its use, it can pose constitutional issues. The
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution requires that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him . . . .”2 The Supreme Court’s postCrawford v. Washington3 interpretation of the Confrontation Clause,
including its most recent clarification in Ohio v. Clark,4 presents a
theoretical obstacle to introducing such evidence in criminal trials.
Before Crawford, prosecutors were required to show only “indicia of
reliability” to support the introduction of evidence over a
Copyright © 2016 J. Peter Letteney.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2016; University of Pennsylvania, M.S.Ed 2009;
University of Delaware, B.A. 2008. I would like to thank Professor Christopher Schroeder for his
help and advice during the preparation of this Note. Also, thank you to the members of the Duke
Law Journal for their hard work.
1. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-442, pt. 1, at 2 (2008) (stating that the Supreme Court first
addressed the use of the state secrets privilege—which allows the Federal Government to prevent
the disclosure of information which would be harmful to the United States—in United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)); Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1962, 1962 (2005) (“[T]he United States has long used [classified] evidence in criminal
prosecutions, military courts-martial and various immigration proceedings.”).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).
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Confrontation Clause challenge.5 Crawford and its progeny require the
district court to examine whether the out-of-court declarant intended
his or her statement to be used in a later prosecution, a far stricter
standard.6 Clark extends Confrontation Clause protection to
statements made by out-of-court declarants to non-law enforcement
persons, such as members of the intelligence community.7 The
expansion in Clark suggests it is time to reevaluate the constitutionality
of the introduction of some classified evidence during a criminal trial.
Although Clark may, in certain scenarios, present a bar to the
government’s introduction of statements collected by U.S. intelligence
agencies, it is unlikely to pose a significant hurdle. The Confrontation
Clause, under current jurisprudence, only classifies as prohibited
“testimonial” statements those that are made with the primary purpose
of creating evidence for a later criminal trial.8 Despite the theoretical
possibility that Clark could bar the introduction of intelligence-agencycollected evidence, it is unlikely to do so in practice. Because many
statements collected by our intelligence agencies—such as those
intercepted electronically from phone calls, emails, or text messages,
or those gathered from foreign agents—were not intended by the
declarant to be used in a trial, or were collected without the declarant’s
knowledge, Clark’s holding is unlikely to be a burden on the use of
classified information derived from foreign intelligence.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses the use of
classified information during criminal trials, and the Classified
Information Procedure Act’s (CIPA) mechanics and constitutionality.
Part II elaborates on the Court’s exposition of the Confrontation
Clause, including its latest pronouncements in Clark. Part III examines
how the post-Clark Confrontation Clause doctrine might affect the use
of foreign-intelligence information in criminal prosecutions, focusing
specifically on the use of signals and human intelligence.9 It argues that,
5. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
6. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth
Amendment demands . . . unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”).
7. Clark, 125 S. Ct. at 2181–82.
8. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011) (describing the “primary purpose” test).
9. Other authors have examined issues related to the Confrontation Clause and classified
evidence, but those studies were conducted before the Court’s decision in Clark. See, e.g., Brian
McEvoy, Note, Classified Evidence and the Confrontation Clause: Correcting a Misapplication of
the Classified Information Procedures Act, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 395, 395 (2005); John Scott,
Comment, “Confronting” Foreign Intelligence: Crawford Roadblocks to Domestic Terrorism
Trials, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1039, 1039 (2011). Because of the decision’s doctrinal
significance, it is necessary to reevaluate the use of classified information after Clark. The
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with one small exception, foreign-intelligence information should be
admissible over a Confrontation Clause objection because speakers
either did not or could not have intended that their statements be used
for later prosecution.
I. USING CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE IN A TRIAL
The nondisclosure of certain sensitive information by the
government during a criminal trial has long been a part of the judicial
process in the United States. In Rovario v. United States,10 the Court
addressed the government’s right to withhold the identity of an
informant from the defendant.11 The Court called for a balance
between the public’s interest in keeping the informant’s identity a
secret with the defendant’s right to fully defend herself.12 A lower court
assessing this balance was required to look at “the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime
charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the
informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.”13 If the informer
provides information “crucial to the defense,” then the government
must either allow the defense to cross-examine the informant or
dismiss the charges.14
The Rovario line of cases15 gave rise to “greymail”—“the dilemma
facing the Government when a defendant claims that he must use

inclusion of classified evidence in criminal trials has also been questioned on due process grounds.
See Note, supra note 1, at 1982.
10. Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
11. Id. at 62. The Court noted that if the informant was known to the defendant, or had died
prior to trial, the privilege would have ended because its purpose was to “shield[] the identity of
an informer from those who would have cause to resent his conduct.” Id. at 60 n.8.
12. Id. at 62.
13. Id.
14. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 600 (1974).
15. The Court has announced varying standards of materiality required to overcome the
government’s privilege. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 870 (1982) (stating
Rovario’s holding as requiring that a court conclude the “informer’s testimony would be highly
relevant” (emphasis added)); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 600 (requiring the information be “crucial to the
defense” (emphasis added)); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698 (1972) (recognizing that an
informer’s “identity cannot be concealed from the defendant when it is critical to his case”
(emphasis added)); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 646 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“The prosecution often dislikes to make public the identity of the informer on whose information
its case rests. But his identity must be disclosed where his testimony is material to the trial.”
(emphasis added)); Rovario, 353 U.S. at 60–61 (“Where the disclosure of an informer’s identity,
or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” (emphasis added)).
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classified information in defending himself.”16 The government is
forced to choose between continuing to prosecute, “thereby
compromising the classified material, or safeguarding the material but
dropping the prosecution.”17 Generally, the defendant would attempt
greymail through a “vague, non-specific[] threat.”18 The government’s
reluctance to reveal classified information led many to worry that
defendants would imperil valid prosecutions even in situations where
the prosecutor could conduct the case within the bounds of due
process.19 Then-Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff Scooter
Libby, who was prosecuted for leaking classified information, and
Oliver North, a National Security Council staffer who was prosecuted
for his involvement with the Iran-Contra scandal, were accused of
using greymail to prevent the government from following through with
their cases.20
In an attempt to limit the greymail problem21 and “strik[e] a
balance” between the government’s interest in keeping classified
information secret, and a defendant’s right to confront the evidence
against herself,22 Congress passed CIPA in 1980, which set out
procedures for the use of classified evidence in criminal prosecutions.23
In doing so, it aimed “to provide Federal courts with clear statutory
guidance on handling secret evidence in criminal cases.”24 CIPA
enables a district court judge to determine whether the government
must give the defendant classified information that it seeks to use
16. See Graymail Legislation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong. 1 (1979) (statement of Rep. Murphy).
17. Id.
18. United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983).
19. Id. at 1197.
20. See Request for ‘Greymail’ May Doom Libby Prosecution, INSIDE BAY AREA (Feb. 25,
2006), http://www.insidebayarea.com/dailyreview/localnews/ci_3546439 [https://perma.cc/GR4AC54D] (describing defendant I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby’s request for the disclosure of 277 highly
classified documents as greymail); Philip A. Lacovara, Graymail, Secrets and the North Trial: Law
on Classified Data Makes Vast Difficulty for All Parties, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 1989) (suggesting that
Oliver North’s attempt to introduce 30,000 classified documents during his defense was greymail).
It should be noted that both of these cases of greymail occurred after the passage of CIPA.
21. See S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 2 (1980) (stating that CIPA was introduced to “minimize the
problem of so-called graymail . . . by requiring a ruling on the admissibility of . . . classified
information before trial”).
22. Arjun Chadran, Note, The Classified Information Procedures Act in the Age of
Terrorism: Remodeling CIPA in an Offense-Specific Manner, 64 DUKE. L.J. 1411, 1412 (2015);
see, e.g., McEvoy, supra note 9, at 395.
23. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 202 (1980) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 (2012)).
24. S. REP. NO. 110-442, pt. 1, at 9 (2008).
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during trial.25 Upon motion, the government can ask the court for an in
camera hearing to determine whether classified information must be
disclosed to the defendant.26 The court is allowed to “consider any
matters which relate to classified information or which may promote a
fair and expeditious trial,”27 and may issue a protective order
disallowing the disclosure of classified information,28 or allow the
government to redact specific items of classified information from the
discovery materials provided to the defendant.29 If the court requires
the government to disclose classified information, the prosecution can
move to provide a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified
information would prove in lieu of revealing the classified material
itself.30
So the government can properly evaluate classified information
before its disclosure in open court, CIPA section 5(a) requires that a
defendant provide notice to the government of her intent to disclose
classified information.31 Failure by the defendant to provide such
notice may preclude disclosure of the information or examination of
the witness.32 If the government objects to disclosure allowed by the
court, the court must dismiss the indictment or information, unless “the
interests of justice would not be served by dismissal.”33 The court may,
however, order other appropriate action instead of dismissing the
action.34
CIPA specifically protects the examination of a witness who might
reveal classified information during examination by the defendant.35
Section 8(c) allows the government to object to any line of questioning

25. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2 (2012).
26. Id. § 6(a).
27. Id. § 2.
28. Id. § 3.
29. Id. § 4.
30. Id. § 6(c)(1). The court must find that the subsitution “will provide the defendant with
substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified
information.” Id.
31. Id. § 5(a); see also United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983)
(describing the intent of § 5(a) to provide both the government and the court prior notice of any
classified information to be introduced by the defense).
32. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(b).
33. Id. § 6(e)(2). This determination is made by the district court.
34. Id. Alternatives to dismissal include ruling that the classified information is immaterial,
allowing a substitution of a summary of the classified information, or allowing the government to
admit the facts that the defendant wants to prove by the use of classified information. Id.
35. See id. § 8(c).
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that “may require the witness to disclose classified information not
previously found to be admissible.”36 After such an objection, the court
is required to determine if the response by the witness will disclose
classified information.37
CIPA has withstood constitutional challenge.38 In United States v.
Wilson,39 the Second Circuit upheld CIPA’s notice provision as applied
to a defendant who was barred from testifying about the classified
details of his work.40 The defendant wanted to testify in the district
court that the activities for which he was being prosecuted were part of
his work for U.S. intelligence.41 The district court, relying on CIPA,
would allow testimony regarding Wilson’s employment by intelligence
agencies and involvement in covert operations, but it would not allow
that testimony to include details of any operations.42 The Second
Circuit found this situation to be exactly what Congress intended CIPA
to cover.43 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the use of CIPA’s
notice provision in a prosecution for fraud on the Armed Forces
against a defendant who wished to reveal details of classified military
intelligence operations.44
United States v. Jolliff45 involved a challenge to the notice
provision based on the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.46 The defendant asserted that the notice provision
required him to reveal classified information to individuals who were
not cleared to know such information—namely, the judge and defense
counsel—in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 798, which criminalizes such

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 32 (D.D.C. 1989) (“[E]very court that
has passed on the constitutionality of CIPA has upheld it.”).
39. United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1984).
40. Id. at 9.
41. Id. at 8–9.
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id.
44. See United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1200 (11th Cir. 1983). The Collins court was
primarily concerned with the vagueness of defendant’s CIPA notice. Id. at 1198–99. The court
considered the defendant’s failure to provide details regarding what classified information was
going to be disclosed as improper. Id. at 1199. The court stated that allowing a vague § 5(a) notice
by a defendant would “merely require the defendant to reduce ‘greymail’ to writing,” because the
government would not be able to evaluate the potential damage to national security without
detail. Id. at 1200.
45. United States v. Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. 229 (D. Md. 1981).
46. Id. at 231.
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disclosure.47 The court found that because the judge did not require a
security clearance to view the classified information,48 and because the
government had offered to provide the defendant’s attorney a
sufficient security clearance, there was no Fifth Amendment
violation.49
Another challenge to CIPA involved former National Security
Advisor John Poindexter, who was prosecuted for his involvement in
the Iran-Contra scandal.50 Poindexter, like those mentioned
previously, challenged CIPA’s notice provision as a violation of his
Fifth Amendment rights.51 He also challenged it for violating his rights
to counsel, due process, and to confront the witnesses against him.52
None of these challenges succeeded.53 The court dismissed
Poindexter’s Confrontation Clause challenge, which was based on
CIPA’s requirement that Poindexter notify the prosecution of his
intention to elicit classified information from prosecution witnesses on
cross-examination.54 In rejecting this challenge, the court stated that
the Confrontation Clause provided Poindexter “an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”55
A more contemporary case, decided after Crawford but before
Clark, also addressed the Sixth Amendment issues raised by using
classified evidence. In In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in

47. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2012); Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. at 231.
48. Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. at 231 (“Section 4 of the Security Procedures Established Pursuant
to Public Law 96–456, 94 Stat. 2025, by the Chief Justice of the United States provides that no
security clearances are required for judges.”).
49. Id.
50. See United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 33–35 (D.D.C. 1989). For information
regarding the Iran-Contra scandal itself, see generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); The
Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE (Nov. 24, 2006), http://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210 [https://perma.cc/3S7Z-Z6F2] (providing declassified
documents relating to the scandal).
51. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. at 33–35.
52. See id. at 31 (“According to defendant, [CIPA] violates his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent; his . . . rights to testify in his own defense; his Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel; his right to cross examine witnesses against him; and his right to
due process of law.”).
53. See id. at 33–35 (rejecting the basis for Poindexter’s constitutional complaints).
54. Id. at 34.
55. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).
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East Africa,56 the Second Circuit held that the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense57 was not violated even though
the defendant himself was not allowed to review the classified
information presented by the government.58 In doing so, the court did
not address any of the then-recent Confrontation Clause cases. Instead,
the court relied on Chambers v. Mississippi,59 a case from 1973, for the
proposition that “a criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine the
witnesses in his case ‘is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow
to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process.’”60
CIPA’s passage provided courts an avenue for addressing the
issues caused by greymail, and created a process for introducing
classified information in criminal proceedings. Classified information
can only be introduced at trial if it complies with Constitutional
requirements, including the Confrontation Clause.61 As will be
discussed below, the Confrontation Clause’s interpretation changed
significantly in the wake of the Court’s decision in Crawford, requiring
a reevaluation of exactly what limits remain on the introduction of
classified evidence.
II. THE CHANGING CONFRONTATION CLAUSE DOCTRINE
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause doctrine has seen
a radical shift in the last dozen years. The Confrontation Clause
requires that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”62 Generally,
56. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (per
curiam).
57. Although the defendant challenged the government’s introduction of evidence on the
basis of the Confrontation Clause, because the government had sought to introduce documents,
not testimony, the court reframed the Confrontation Clause challenge as a Sixth Amendment
challenge for deprivation “of his right to present a defense.” Id. at 123 n.27.
58. Id. at 127. The court also upheld a district court requirement that all persons wanting
access to classified information were required to hold a security clearance, including defense
counsel. Id. at 122. This requirement was constitutional “as long as the application . . . does not
deprive the defense of evidence that would be ‘useful to counter the government’s case or to
bolster a defense.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2008)).
59. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
60. In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 127 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295).
61. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 255 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
government . . . may either declassify the document, seek approval of an effective substitute, or
forego its use altogether. . . . [H]id[ing] the evidence from the defendant, but giv[ing] it to the
jury . . . . plainly violates the Confrontation Clause.”).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

LETTENEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/10/2016 11:40 AM

2016] CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE’S “PRIMARY PURPOSE”

9

hearsay evidence—an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of
the matter asserted—is not admissible.63 Hearsay statements can be
admitted, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, if they exhibit
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.64 Before Crawford,
courts were required to look for similar “indicia of reliability” when
deciding whether an out-of-court statement was allowed over a
Confrontation Clause objection.65 As long as the declarant was
unavailable and the statement was trustworthy, there was no
Confrontation Clause bar to the introduction of hearsay testimony.66
Crawford signaled a major change in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. Speaking for the Court, Justice Scalia—seeking to bring
the “application of the Confrontation Clause back to its original
meaning”67—found that any time “testimonial” evidence is presented,
the Sixth Amendment requires that the defendant have an opportunity
to cross-examine either at trial, or before trial if the declarant is both
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine.68 He explained:
An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark
to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history
underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an
especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court
statement.69

Crawford generally left the definition of “testimonial statements” for
later cases, but did enumerate a few types of covered statements: those
taken by police in an interrogation, statements before a grand jury, and
those made in court by a witness.70

63. FED. R. EVID. 801–02.
64. See id. 803–07 (such as when the declarant has a particularly strong motive to tell the
truth or the circumstances of the statement would make falsehoods easy to discover).
65. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (allowing admission of statements falling
within strong hearsay exceptions for trustworthiness).
66. See id. (“[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”).
67. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2184 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining
the Court’s opinion in Crawford, which he authored).
68. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
69. Id. at 51.
70. Id. at 68.
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Later cases expanded the definition of “testimonial statements.”
Davis v. Washington71 established that statements are testimonial
where the primary purpose of the statement is to establish or prove
past events for criminal prosecution.72 In that case, statements made to
police during an emergency were not considered testimonial because
“the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”73 Michigan v. Bryant74
requires that courts “objectively evaluate the circumstances in which
the encounter occurs and the statements and actions of the parties.”75
In doing so, a court must evaluate the conduct of both the declarant
and the interrogator76 to determine whether the primary purpose of a
statement was to “creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony.”77 The Court has identified, however, that statements made
during an emergency to “seek or render aid”78 are not testimonial.79
This primary-purpose test was underscored in both MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts80 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico,81 which dealt
with the introduction of laboratory reports as evidence during trial. In
Melendez-Diaz, the Court held that a forensic laboratory report which
was “created specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal
proceeding”82 constituted testimonial evidence, requiring that the
defendant be able to cross-examine the laboratory analysts either at or
before trial.83 The prosecution was not allowed to introduce the report
without also producing a witness who could testify to the truth of the
information in it.84 The case left open the question of whether someone
who was familiar with the testing procedures could testify as to the

71. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
72. Id. at 822.
73. Id.
74. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011).
75. Id. at 359.
76. Id. at 367.
77. Id. at 358.
78. Anne R. Traum, Confrontation After Ohio v. Clark, NEV. LAW., Oct. 2015 at 17, 19.
79. See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 377–78 (finding that the declarant’s statements to police about
the location and identity of an active shooter were not testimonial); Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (categorizing statements on a 9-1-1 call “to enable police assistance” as
nontestimonial).
80. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
81. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011).
82. Id. at 651 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305).
83. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311.
84. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 651 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305).
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truth of a lab report based on knowledge and experience. Bullcoming
clarified the Melendez-Diaz requirement by asserting that if laboratory
results are introduced, the prosecution must also allow confrontation
of “the analyst who made the certification” unless the analyst is
unavailable and there was an opportunity to cross-examine at an
earlier point.85
Clark raised the question of whether the introduction of witness
statements made to non-law enforcement personnel could violate a
defendant’s Confrontation Clause right, and answered in the
affirmative.86 Clark involved statements made by a three-year-old to
his preschool teachers regarding the child’s potential abuser.87 The
Court held that the statements were not made for the primary purpose
of creating evidence for trial, and were therefore not testimonial.88 In
doing so, the Court distinguished statements made to police from those
made to others. Although statements made to non-law enforcement
personnel are “significantly less likely to be testimonial than
statements given to law enforcement officers,” their introduction could
still violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right if the declarant’s
primary purpose was to create evidence for criminal prosecution.89
III. INTRODUCING CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE AFTER OHIO V. CLARK
Because Clark extends Confrontation Clause protection to
statements made to non-law enforcement persons, such as members of
the intelligence community, the introduction of certain types of
classified evidence must be reevaluated. This Part looks at whether the
introduction of classified information obtained by intelligence agencies
may run afoul of the Crawford/Clark requirements. It first surveys
various intelligence-information collection scenarios and how the
method of collection may impact the use of evidence at trial. It then
examines the primary-purpose requirement of Crawford. The Part
argues that it is unlikely, under most scenarios, that introducing
intelligence-derived evidence will violate the Confrontation Clause
because it would be rare for a declarant—in intelligence-collection
circumstances—to have made statements with the “primary purpose”
of creating evidence for prosecution.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 652.
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015).
Id. at 2178.
Id. at 2181–82.
Id.
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A. Collection of Classified Evidence
The Crawford/Clark line of cases is concerned with statements
that are intentionally given by witnesses with the primary purpose of
creating evidence for criminal prosecution.90 Because the vast majority
of intelligence-collected statements, especially those in the signalsintelligence realm, are not intentionally provided by the declarant to
law enforcement or an intelligence agency, Crawford/Clark restrictions
likely do not apply.
Intelligence information is used to provide our elected and
military leaders with data that shape their decisions and actions in areas
as diverse as foreign policy, counterterrorism, military maneuvering,
and nuclear non-proliferation.91 The United States has a number of
ways to collect intelligence, including human intelligence (HUMINT),
signals intelligence (SIGINT), open-source intelligence, imagery and
geospatial intelligence, and measurement and signature intelligence.92
“SIGINT is intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems . . .
such as communications systems, radars, and weapons systems.”93
Although each type of intelligence has different uses, SIGINT provides
the greatest share of information that makes it into the President’s
Daily Brief (which signifies the importance of the information).94
HUMINT, as the name suggests, refers to “the collection of
information from human sources.”95
90. See supra Part II.
91. For an excellent overview of intelligence collection and analysis, various uses of
intelligence-derived information, and the U.S. intelligence community, see generally JEFFREY T.
RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (7th ed. 2016).
92. See id. at 2–3 (describing ways the United States collects intelligence).
93. NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, Signals Intelligence (May 3, 2016), https://www.nsa.gov/what-wedo/signals-intelligence [https://perma.cc/3RSZ-5T94].
94. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companie
s-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html?hpid=
z1 [https://perma.cc/4URN-SEYA] (stating that the PRISM program, which collected internet
SIGINT, accounted for nearly 1500 items in the Presidential Daily Brief in 2012); Lauren Harper,
National Security Agency Has Pushed to “Rethink and Reapply” Its Treatment of the Fourth
Amendment Since Before 9/11, UNREDACTED (June 10, 2013), https://nsarchive.wordpress.
com/2013/06/10/national-security-agency-has-pushed-to-rethink-and-reapply-its-treatment-ofthe-fourth-amendment-since-before-911 [https://perma.cc/9EGA-PM2N] (“[B]y January 2001,
60% of the Presidential Daily Briefings were based upon SIGINT, a percentage that has surely
increased over the last decade.”).
95. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Intelligence Branch, https://www.fbi.gov/
about/leadership-and-structure/intelligence-branch [https://perma.cc/TMQ8-FMW2]. For a short
primer on all types of intelligence, see id.
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B. Primary-Purpose Test
As a threshold matter, the introduction of SIGINT- and
HUMINT-collected statements could pose a Confrontation Clause
issue because the declarant is unlikely to be produced for crossexamination either before or during trial. This is the case because
either the declarant does not know that her communications are being
intercepted, or the declarant is working with U.S. intelligence officials
to uncover information about our allies or adversaries. In either case,
making the declarant available for trial, if even possible, would reveal
the “sources and methods” by which the U.S. intelligence apparatus
goes about its work.96 Under the Crawford/Clark doctrine though, the
court looks beyond the availability of the declarant for crossexamination, and instead looks to the declarant’s purpose for making
the statement.97 For this reason, it is unlikely that most intelligence
gathered through SIGINT or HUMINT means would trigger a
requirement that the government produce the declarant. There is,
however, at least one scenario in the HUMINT context wherein the
failure to do so would violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right—where a source in U.S. custody specifically attempts to
incriminate another person by providing information to U.S.
intelligence officers.
1. Signals Intelligence. The primary-purpose test requires that the
declarant give a statement to another person with the intention or
foresight of creating evidence for use in a prosecution in order to
trigger the Confrontation Clause.98 This explanation of “testimonial
statements” may insulate the use of a great deal of SIGINT from the
Confrontation Clause requirement. Even though statements were
procured by non-law enforcement personnel, which could trigger
Confrontation Clause requirements under Clark,99 statements

96. See Robert M. Clark, The Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods, THE
INTELLIGENCER, Fall 2016, at 61, 61, http://www.afio.com/publications/CLARK%20Robert
%20The%20Protection%20of%20Intelligence%20Sources%20and%20Methods%20FINAL%
202016Oct15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PKZ-JXGT] (distinguishing between the product of
intelligence and the sources and methods used to obtain that intelligence, and stating that “[t]he
highest level of protection is placed on information that might allow someone to determine the
identity of the source” of intelligence information).
97. See supra Part II.
98. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
99. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015).
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procured by SIGINT methods are not generally made with the
intention or foresight of producing evidence for trial.
SIGINT methods are designed to collect information without the
target being aware of the collection.100 The fact that the declarant is
unaware that his or her statement—for example, one made in an
intercepted phone call or email—is being recorded or monitored
strongly suggests that there can be no legitimate argument that the
statement was made with the “primary purpose” of creating
information for a later criminal prosecution.
The lower courts have found this line of argument applicable to
the use of Title III wiretaps and statements recorded by undercover
officers or confidential informants (CI). In Brown v. Epps,101 the Fifth
Circuit relied on dicta from Davis stating that “statements made
unwittingly
to
a
government
informant
were
‘clearly
nontestimonial,’”102 to uphold the introduction of statements recorded
by a confidential informant at a criminal trial.103 In Brown, police used
a wire-wearing CI to record statements made by the defendant over
the phone before a controlled drug buy.104 Similarly, in United States v.
Udeozor,105 the Fourth Circuit held that police-recorded telephone
calls were not testimonial because “no reasonable person in [the
declarant’s] position would have expected his statements to be used
later at trial. [The declarant] certainly did not expect that his
statements would be used prosecutorially; in fact, he expected just the

100. The unknowing nature of the transmission of intelligence information to the U.S.
government may have changed after the relevation of a number of intelligence programs by
National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. See, e.g., Shane Harris, CIA’s Ex-No. 2
Says ISIS ‘Learned from Snowden,’ DAILY BEAST (May 6, 2015, 4:24 PM), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/06/cia-s-ex-no-2-says-isis-learned-from-snowden.html
[https://perma.cc/8ZLU-3KSU] (“U.S. intelligence officials have long argued that Snowden’s
disclosures provided valuable insights to terrorist groups and nation-state adversaries, including
China and Russia, about how the U.S. monitors communications around the world.”); Jason
Leopold, Official Reports on the Damage Caused by Edward Snowden’s Leaks Are Totally
Redacted, VICE NEWS (Feb. 25, 2015, 12:30 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/official-reports-onthe-damage-caused-by-edward-snowdens-leaks-are-totally-redacted [https://perma.cc/V2UNKWRD] (“As the Director of National Intelligence has stated, terrorists and other adversaries of
this country are going to school on US intelligence sources methods and trade craft, and the
insights that they are gaining are making our job much, much harder . . . .”).
101. Brown v. Epps, 686 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2012).
102. Id. at 287 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 (2006)).
103. Id. at 288.
104. Id. at 283–84.
105. United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2008).
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opposite.”106 In Udeozor, unlike in Brown, the prosecution introduced
a victim’s telephone conversation with a third-party declarant.107 All
circuit courts that have addressed the issue have found that statements
recorded without the declarant’s knowledge of the recording were not
testimonial.108 Clark’s assertion that statements made to non-law
enforcement personnel could be testimonial has not been read to
change this calculus.
The wiretap and CI cases suggest that the police’s intention with
regard to recording statements is immaterial to establish a violation of
the Confrontation Clause’s primary-purpose test. In both cases, law
enforcement intended to create evidence for later prosecution. In
Udeozor, the court stated that the intentions of police are only relevant
if a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have expected
the statements to be used in a later prosecution.109 Because emails and
telephone calls intercepted by intelligence agencies could not be
intended or expected by a reasonable declarant to be used in a later
criminal prosecution, it is unlikely that such evidence would run afoul
of the Crawford/Clark Confrontation Clause requirements. The fact
that intelligence agencies are intercepting communications is intended
to be secret, much like a wiretap in the domestic-surveillance
context.110 If the declarant—for example, a terrorist based outside of
the United States—does not know that her communications are being
intercepted, it is unlikely that she intends her statements to be used in
a later prosecution. It would be implausible for such a speaker to have
the “primary purpose” of creating evidence for prosecution if she is
unaware the statements are being recorded. Therefore, after Clark,

106. Id. at 269.
107. Id. at 266–67.
108. Brown, 686 F.3d at 287–88 (“[S]tatements unknowingly made to an undercover
officer . . . are not testimonial . . . . Many other Circuits have come to the same conclusion, and
none disagree.” (citing United States v. Dale, 614 F.3d 942, 956 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 778 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir.
2009); United States v. Watson, 525 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2008); Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 269–70;
United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hendricks,
395 F.3d 173, 182–84 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229–30 (2d Cir. 2004))).
109. Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 270.
110. Intelligence-agency leaders claimed that Edward Snowden’s exposure of the National
Security Agency’s SIGINT collection programs did significant damage to U.S. national security
precisely because after the leaks intelligence targets knew the methods NSA could use to intercept
their communications. James Gordon Meek, Luis Martinez & Alexander Mallin, Intel Heads:
Edward Snowden Did ‘Profound Damage’ to U.S. Security, ABC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/intel-heads-edward-snowden-profound-damage-us-security/story
?id=22285388 [https://perma.cc/V774-YHHC].
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even though these statements are made outside a courtroom to nonlaw enforcement personnel, their use would not violate a defendant’s
Confrontation Clause right.
2. Human Intelligence. The introduction of HUMINT-collected
statements is more likely to violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right than SIGINT, but the likelihood remains low. HUMINT comes
in many forms, including interviews with a friendly source, or
interrogation of a hostile detainee.111 HUMINT may be the only way
of getting access to certain information held by an intelligence target,
and therefore can be of enormous value to the United States,112 both
for its intelligence value, and for its prosecutorial value. Studies in 1994
found that HUMINT made a critical contribution to 204 of 376 specific
intelligence issues.113
HUMINT could pose Confrontation Clause challenges that are
unlikely to be present with SIGINT. In contrast with SIGINT,
HUMINT sources generally know that they are making statements to
U.S. government personnel. Sources of HUMINT provide information
to the U.S. for any number of reasons, including money, ideology,
coercion, and ego.114 Courts, in determining whether a HUMINT
source provided testimonial statements, would look not at their overall
motivation, but their reason for giving that particular statement.
The strictures of CIPA could prevent the court from determining
the declarant’s primary purpose for making a statement. Under CIPA,
the government can withhold the declarant’s identity and merely
provide a summary of the information obtained from the source.115
Though the anonymity of the declarant does not pose a Confrontation
Clause problem by itself,116 when combined with the government’s
ability to create a factual summary of the information in the
statements, a defendant may plausibly raise a claim that the statements
were intended by the declarant to be used in a criminal prosecution. A
111. RICHELSON, supra note 91, at 2.
112. Id. at 319.
113. Id.
114. Randy Burkett, An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to
RASCALS, 57 STUD. INTELLIGENCE, Mar. 2013, at 7, 7 https://www.cia.gov/library/center-forthe-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-57-no.-1-a/vol.-57-no.-1-a-pdfs/
Burkett-MICE%20to%20RASCALS.pdf [https://perma.cc/QVM4-Z2UV].
115. See supra Part I.
116. See Brown v. Epps, 686 F.3d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that an “unidentified
[declarant’s] recorded statements were not testimonial, and therefore their admission did not
violate the Confrontation Clause”).
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reviewing court would have difficulty determining what the source’s
“primary motivation” was because the court would not have access to
information about the source, or the method that the government used
to elicit the statement.
One could imagine a scenario wherein the perpetrator of a failed
terrorist attack is arrested and brought to trial in a federal court.117 The
intelligence community, in its effort to stop further attacks, detains and
interrogates the defendant’s co-conspirator overseas. The detainee,
angry with his associate’s failure, gives interrogators information he
intends to be used to convict the failed terrorist. Such a situation would
produce, under Crawford/Clark, a statement made to a U.S.
intelligence official (who is not a law enforcement officer) with the
primary purpose of providing evidence for trial. Before Clark was
decided, it was unclear whether the statements would violate the Sixth
Amendment. However, after Clark, these statements would be
deemed testimonial even though they were not made to a law
enforcement officer. If the government were able to conceal both the
identity of the source and provide the court with a CIPA-sanctioned
summary of the facts gleaned from the interrogation, there would be a
surreptitious violation of the Confrontation Clause upon introduction
of the evidence. Thus, although the introduction of SIGINT evidence
is unlikely to ever violate the Sixth Amendment, it is possible, in a
particular scenario, that HUMINT evidence would violate a
defendant’s constitutional right.
In the vast majority of cases, declarant statements would be
allowed without violating the Confrontation Clause. However, as
discussed above, there are some situations wherein HUMINT-derived
statements could present Confrontation Clause issues after the Court’s
decision in Clark, because although the statements were made to nonlaw enforcement personnel, they were made with the intention of being
used for later prosecution.118
CONCLUSION
Changes to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
doctrine in the wake of the Court’s decision in Crawford have
drastically changed the analysis when determining whether an out-of117. This scenario is based loosely on facts from United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th
Cir. 2004).
118. See Burkett, supra note 114, at 7 (explaining the motivations for becoming an intelligence
source).
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court hearsay statement can be introduced. Subsequent cases,
including Clark, provide clarification for litigants. Clark’s
acknowledgement that statements made to non-law enforcement
personnel can be testimonial suggests that prosecutors seeking to use
classified intelligence information should be aware of the challenges
presented by the Confrontation Clause. Although Confrontation
Clause issues could plausibly arise in some cases, nearly all
prosecutions using evidence from SIGINT, and most using HUMINT,
would avoid any Sixth Amendment problems.

